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Abstract. The effects of financial liberalization policy on banking efficiency are backed up neither by 
theoretical studies nor by empirical studies. The main objective of this study is to analyze the evolution of 
productivity of Cameroonian commercial banks, following the implementation of the recent financial 
liberalization measures. For this purpose, we use the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) method to measure 
the evolution of efficiency, and The Malmquist Index to measure and decompose the total factor productivity. 
The results show that the effects of financial liberalization are mixed because many transmission channels 
were either insensitive; or they evolved in an unexpected direction due to a decline in loans to the economy. 
We recommend that institutional measures be taken, so as to improve the business environment and enable 
banks to overcome difficulties in having reliable accounting and financial information on loan applicants. 
Keywords: bankruptcy, financial liberalization, efficiency, Malmquist Index, commercial banks 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Financial intermediation in Cameroon is carried out almost entirely by commercial banks. That is, if 
they are effective, they will stimulate economic growth through three channels. The first is 
technological innovation. A banking system that functions normally identifies and funds entrepreneurs 
who have the best opportunities of success in their innovative activities (Schumpeter, 1912; Brou, 
2010). The second is financial innovation that reduces the cost of financial intermediation and thereby 
stimulates savings (Kane, 1988; Sobreira, 2004). The third channel is the efficiency of factors of 
production as well as the reducing of individual risks related to investment projects; through 
diversification and risk sharing (Levine, 1997; Brou, 2010). 
But these transmission channels and the financial development itself are strongly influenced by the 
financial system that can be centered on banks or markets (Diatkine, 2002), bank concentration that 
reduces competition in the sector and can lead to a misallocation of resources (Guillaumont and 
Kpodar, 2006), and the legal and economic institutions of the country (La Porta et al, 1996. Levine et 
al, 2000.). Talking about legal institutions, the financial regulation adopted by Cameroon since its 
independence was intended primarily to promote the so-called drivers of the economy sectors, through 
preferential interest rates.  
But this policy did not produce the desired effect, and led to a banking crisis in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Measures taken to deal with this situation were geared towards the liberalization of the 
banking sector. These measures involved the following actions: the withdrawal of the quantitative loan 
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controls by the State, privatization of public banks; and the selling-off of those that were in 
bankruptcy, the introduction of market mechanisms in the management of the credit policy, the 
liberalization of the interest rate, and the creation of an oversight body which is the Banking 
Commission of Central Africa (COBAC). 
But at the theoretical level, researchers are not unanimous on the effects of financial liberalization on 
the efficiency of banks. According to the neo-structuralists (Taylor, 1983; Van, 1983; Venet, 1994), 
financial liberalization slows banking productivity because of the risk of inflation and a reduction in 
the total supply of real bank loan. On the contrast, according to the optimistic approach initiated by 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), financial liberalization has positive effects on the productivity of 
banks; namely through the setting of conditions for nominal interest rates, the increase in bank 
deposits, and investment. These theoretical differences have been confirmed in several empirical 
studies (World Bank, 1989 and Guillaumont-Jeanneney, 1998). 
The objective of this study is to clarify the effects that the financial liberalization measures likely had 
on the efficiency of commercial banks in Cameroon. The theoretical framework is based on the 
arguments of liberals, which were advanced to justify financial liberalization within the country. The 
measurement of efficiency aims at determining the extent to which banks provide an optimal 
combination of financial services from a given set of inputs.  
In other words, the ability of banks to effectively produce the necessary services to the financing of 
economic agents is questionable. For this reason, the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) method and 
the Malmquist Index are used to measure bank efficiency and productivity in banking, and to 
decompose technological progress and technological efficiency, respectively. They have the advantage 
of being non-parametric. That is, they do not require an algebraically functional form of productivity. 
The work is structured as follows: Section 1 deals with the literature review. Section 2 describes the 
bank failure in Cameroon and the liberalization measures adopted. Section 3 presents the methodology 
used for obtaining the estimates and the results. Section 4 deals with the conclusion. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
The purpose of the literature review is to explain the theoretical and empirical differences between 
financial liberalization and bank efficiency on the one hand; and on the other hand, it discusses the 
efficiency measures adopted. 
 
2.1  Interactions between financial liberalization and bank efficiency 
Financial liberalization has been heavily criticized by neo-structuralists such as Taylor (1983), Van 
(1983) and Venet (1994); who fear inflation risks, the accentuation of dualism in the economy (formal 
and informal), and a reduction in the total supply of real bank loans. These researchers are supported 
by international organizations such as the Bank for International Settlements and the United Nations 
Commission for Africa. They explain that with financial liberalization: (i) the control of interest rates 
escapes monetary authorities; (ii) the opening of capital markets outside the country exposes the 
economy to extraversion; (iii) the increase in the intensity of bank savings exposes banks to the 
decline of their profit margins, due to the high level of payable interest rates; (iv) high deposit interest 
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rates reduce investment and create inflation, which enhances speculative activities at the expense of 
productive investment. 
In keeping with this logic, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show a relationship between asymmetry of 
information and financial liberalization. In fact, with the increase in deposit rates, banks will rather 
attract bad borrowers; while their low value is the guarantee of a better quality of loan applicants. 
From the preceding, it appears that it is the financial repression that increases the efficiency of banks. 
In deepening research based on this approach, Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) argues that banks that take 
advantage of liberalization to take excessive risks, experience a high rate of bad loans, deterioration in 
the quality of their commitments, and insufficiency of their capital. Therefore, financial liberalization 
is more likely to lead to banking crises in the African context (Arestis and Basu, 2003). 
Combining DEA with Malmquist’s Index, several studies show degradation of banks productivity 
consecutive to financial liberalization measures; due to excessive increase in real interest rates. These 
include Wheelock and Wilson (1999) on American banks, Worthington (1999) on a sample of 
Australian banks, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) on the Spanish banks, and Ranbart Kaminski (1996), 
World Bank (1989) and Guillaumont-Jeanneney (1998) in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Philippines, and 
Turkey. 
However, according to the Liberals MacKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), financial liberalization eases 
the conditions of formation of nominal interest rates; so that banks offer investors a fair return on 
deposits, and charge more precisely loans made and the services they offer to their customers. The 
consequence is an increase in deposit rates: which causes an increase in funds available for 
investment. This results simultaneously into a decrease in inflation and an increase in savings (Kapur, 
1976). In the same logic and according Venet (1994), the increase in credit interest rates consecutive 
to the liberalization of the financial sector encourages deposits agents, and thereby increases the 
capacity of the banking sector: and ultimately stimulates investment. Banking intermediation brings 
about greater efficiency. 
Another approach which is used to explain the positive effects of financial liberalization is that of Fry 
(1997). Fry explains that financial repression keeps the real interest rates (nominal rate minus 
inflation) at a low level. Three types of consequences are identified: (i) agents with financing capacity 
prefer to hold real assets rather than to purchase financial assets; (ii) banks are inclined to credit 
rationing that is, to select the least risky credits; (iii) the behavior of banks induces a bias in favor of 
the current consumption: which affects savings negatively. According to the author, these three 
consequences result into: a less productive and under-developed banking system; characterized by the 
scarcity of savings, low investment, and low capital productivity. 
Empirically, the positive effects of financial liberalization on bank efficiency have been proven in two 
empirical approaches. The first approach is indirect because in this case, the efficiency is assessed 
through proxies’ variables. This approach includes works by: Fry (1981) on a sample of twelve Asian 
countries, the World Bank (1989) on a sample of 34 developing countries, and King and Levine 
(1993) on a sample of 80 countries. Overall, the results indicate a positive relationship between 
financial liberalization and the real interest rate, bankable projects, investments, and services offered 
by banks. The second approach is direct, and studies in this case measure the efficiency itself. These 
studies have always been made following a reform of the banking system. The methodology generally 
combines the DEA and Malmquist’s Index. Three cases in point are: works by Chaffai and Dietsch 
(1997) on Tunisian banks between 1986 and 1988, works by Leightner and Lovell (1998) on Thai 
banks, works by Kablan (2009) in the countries of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa 
(WAEMU ⁄ UEMOA). 
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Taking into cognizance the fact that the liberalization of the financial sector in Cameroon aroused 
hopes to rehabilitate the said sector, we draw the liberal theoretical framework for understanding the 
effects it likely had on the efficiency of commercial banks. This framework identifies the changes in 
interest income and expense rates, amount of deposits, amounts and quality of loans, and bank 
concentration, as the main transmission channels of financial liberalization on the efficiency of 
commercial banks. 
 
2.2  Discussion of the DEA method as efficiency measurement 
The idea of measuring the efficiency of a production unit goes back to the work of Farrell (1957). 
According to this author, efficiency means minimizing as much as possible the inputs that allow the 
production level of the output (output-oriented measurement); or to maximize as much as possible the 
output for a given level of inputs (input oriented measurement). Today, this idea is extended to any 
organization; whether commercial or not, since the output can be defined as any objective that a 
business wants to attain including profit, revenue, or any other results. The input is then understood as 
a coercion of quantity or price. Whatever the case, the more effective the company is, the more it 
approaches its efficiency boundary: which is the set of points which optimally combine the inputs to 
achieve an output unit. The literature offers two approaches to build this boundary, so as to measure 
efficiency namely, the parametric approach and the non-parametric approach. 
The parametric approach often consists of specifying the boundary following a translogarithmic 
function. This is particularly the case of English et al. (1993) on the U.S. banking system of the 1990s, 
Allen and Rai (1996) who compared the efficiencies of banks installed in countries with different 
regulatory environments, and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) who have the same goals as Allen and 
Rai (1996). But the latter include environmental variables in their measurement of efficiency. 
Whatever type of function, the formulation of the boundary can be deterministic. In this case, all 
deviations from the boundary are attributed to inefficiency. It can also be stochastic; as it is possible to 
distinguish between random errors and inefficiency. In the latter case, the stochastic cost boundary is 
written as follows, according Kablan (2009): 
    uv ccywfC −+= ),(ln                            (1) 
where C is the total cost, and f the functional form chosen for the cost function. Here, w is the vector 
of input prices, y the vector of outputs, vc the vector of noises independently distributed according to 
the normal law N(0, σ
2
v
); and uc the inefficiency defined positively: with an asymmetric distribution 
which is independent from vc. Despite its interest, the results obtained in the parametric approach vary 
with the estimation of the boundary function selected. This shortcoming is more pronounced in the 
case where the researcher is working on a sample with a plurality of individuals; for they are not 
supposed to have the same functional form of the boundary. 
The nonparametric approach or mathematical approach; known as DEA method, assesses the 
boundary through linear mathematical programming; without the need for a functional form. The 
implementation of DEA however relies on one or the other of two models. The model with constant 
profit scale developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and Lovell (1994) is based on the assumption that all 
banks operate in an environment of perfect competition. On the other hand, the model of variable 
profit scale developed by Banker et al. (1984) is based on the most relevant assumption that banks 
operate in an environment of imperfect competition. We follow this approach in this research. 
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3 Bankruptcy and liberalization in Cameroon 
 
3.1  The banking crisis of the 1980s and 1990s and the content of liberalization 
The banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in Cameroon, was directly attributable to the 
monetary policy adopted since independence; and strengthened by the regulations of 1973 
reformation. In its monetary principles, this policy sought to promote the so-called vital areas through 
preferential interest rates, and resulted into a strengthening of the State supervision on banks through 
participation purchases in their registered capital. But the officers appointed by the government; and 
sometimes without proper qualification, granted loans under pressure from influential politicians, 
officials or members of their tribe (Sandretto and Tiani, 1993). It was observed that even public 
companies which were financially unbalanced received financial supports from banks. In a nutshell, 
the frequent interferences of the State in the management of banks had heavily skewed economic 
criteria for granting credit.  
A project in a non-priority sector could be more profitable than another in an area called a “priority 
sector”, and not find financing. Similarly, some unprofitable projects could find funding because of 
policies of preferential interest rates. Under these conditions, the market mechanisms which were 
supposed to play the role of regulator of the banking system could not operate, and the banking system 
could not contribute to economic growth (Kablan, 2009). It is in this context that the bank failure 
occurred. 
This bankruptcy was linked to multiple causes including mismanagement, economic difficulties, and a 
low degree of financial increase (Mathis, 1992 Kane and Tara, 2001). According to the results of 
investigations conducted by the inspection teams COBAC, more than 90% of bank failures stemmed 
from internal deficiencies and mismanagement. The weakness in the internal control system was 
evidenced notably through a lack of reliable accounting in some institutions, an inefficient 
administrative organization, a low-skilled staff, lack of innovations in banking products, lack of alert 
tools such as the management control. 
The bankruptcy manifested itself by a high stiffness of cash, an accumulation of deficit management 
balances, and significant credit losses (the Black, 1992; Sandretto and Tiani, 1993). According to 
Nembot and Ningaye (2011), the rate of bank profitability was almost negative or close to zero in 
Cameroon; as in all other states of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC), between 1990 and 1996. Many banks could not resist in the face of this suffocating 
situation, and went bankrupt. These banks include the Cameroon Bank Corporation (SBC), the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce Cameroon (BCCC), the National Fund for Rural Development (FONADER), 
the Cameroon Development Bank (BCD), the bank Paribas -Cameroon (PARIBAS), and the 
Cameroon Bank (CB), in 1989 alone. 
To cope with this situation, financial liberalization which was undertaken in Cameroon was based on 
five main components. The first component was the removal of credit controls, and it aimed at 
removing restrictions on building banks portfolios. The second was privatization or the closing public 
banks and the withdrawal of the State capital from the banking sector. These first two measures 
resulted into the closure of Crédit Agricole and the privatization of the Cameroon international Bank 
for Savings and Loans (BICEC). The third measure was the freedom granted to banks, to negotiate 
interest rates with their customers within the Maximum Debtor Rate (MDR) and the Minimum 
Creditor Rate (MCR) adopted by the BEAC. As to the interbank market rate, they are totally free and 
their values are hence forth determined by the law of supply and demand; without the intervention of 
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the BEAC. The fourth measure adopted by the State was free access to the national financial system: 
which gave rise to foreign ownership of national banks, on the one hand; and the other hand, to the 
establishment of foreign banks in the national financial system. The fifth measure was the creation of 
COBAC, followed by the Harmonization of the Banking Regulations in Central Africa, to control the 
banking business while giving them greater managerial autonomy and a safer legal environment. The 
implementation of all these measures was effective from 1993 with the start-up of COBAC. This 
financial liberalization conveyed the hope of spearheading a dynamic of competitiveness and 
efficiency, that would foster the achievement of the goals of development. 
 
3.2  The current state of the Cameroonian banking system 
In Cameroon, four types of financial structures may qualify for financial intermediaries: (i) the tontine 
belongs to the informal sector, and one hardly has reliable information about their inputs and outputs; 
(ii) the Douala Stock Exchange (DSX) is a recent stock market as it was created on November 1, 
2001; (iii) microfinance institutions (MFIs) whose activities are expanding. According COBAC, there 
were 490 MFIs in 2009. This is a decline, when one considers the 652 MFIs recorded in 2000.  But 
these 490 MFIs had 1052 branches; against 700 recorded in 2000. On the other hand, the number of 
members / clients is in great increase: 849,030 members / clients against 219,410 recorded in 2000. 
But the MFIs are sponsored by a conventional bank, and it does not seem appropriate to consider them 
as separate entities in the sample. The fourth type of financial structure that may qualify for financial 
intermediary in Cameroon is commercial banks. There are twelve of them: Afriland First Bank (First 
Bank), International Bank of Cameroon for Savings and Loans (BICEC), Citibank N.A. Cameroon 
(Citibank), Commercial Bank of Cameroon (CBC), Commercial Bank Corporation - Cameroon (CA-
SBC), Ecobank Cameroon (Ecobank), National Financial Credit Bank (NFC Bank), Société Générale 
de Banques au Cameroon (SGBC), Standard Chartered Bank Cameroon (SCBC), Union Bank of 
Cameroon Plc (UBC Plc), United Bank for Africa (UBA), and Atlantic Bank Cameroon (BACM). 
Some recent indicators of the performance of Cameroonian commercial banks are listed in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1 Some recent indicators of the performance of Cameroonian banks 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Customer deposits * 1238201 1366357 1549549 1772651 1971603 2159448 
Net loans 776191 867253 894920 956799 1179930 1283496 
Gross doubtful loans 99677 104123 123137 120998 142578 140158 
Long-term loans 2721 9142 12952 20183 30257 31816 
Medium-term loans 249091 321984 332511 356527 420751 527043 
Short-term credit 227348 260956 303140 304833 361363 421706 
Net banking 122418 125567 132402 139055 163131 171477 
Earnings 21111 21772 23868 25678 26411 -5769 
Average yield credit 10,55 % 10,39 % 10,53 % 9,41 % 8,25 % 8,13 % 
Equity accounting 102103 116541 147471 155369 145286 131739 
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Income ratio 52,41 % 54,78 % 55,81 % 57,70 % 54,44 % 60,68 % 
Number of banks 10 10 11 12 12 12 
Number of agencies 96 103 118 128 129 142 
Source: Annual Reports of the COBAC 
Note: * Values are in millions of CFA francs except % data, the number of banks and the number of branches. 
 
Table 1 shows that from 2004 to 2009, the level of customer deposits and net loans rose by 74.40% 
and 65.35%, respectively. This increase can be justified by the increase in the number of banks from 
10 in 2004 to 12 in 2009.  
As to the management and profitability of banks, Table1 shows that from 2004 to 2007, the operating 
income ratio increased from 52.41% to 57.70%. This increase shows a recovery in bank management. 
The analysis of the net banking income shows an increase of 40.07%. In addition, the net income 
increased from 21.11billion to 26.411billion, between 2004 and 2008. Conversely, from 2008 to 2009, 
there was deterioration in profitability: which dropped from 26.411 billion to a deficit of 5.769 billion. 
All this information enables us to assess; through statistical tools, the effects of financial liberalization 
on the efficiency and productivity of commercial banks, and to break it down into pure technical 
efficiency and pure efficiency. To achieve this purpose, the data used in this research are secondary 
and are collected at the National Institute of Statistics (INS) and COBAC. 
Table 2 Aggregate data before and after the implementation of financial liberalization  measures (in 
million FCFA) 
Year Total 
loans‡ 
Net 
result‡ 
Total 
deposits † 
Staff 
costs† 
Net Fixed 
Assets† 
Number of 
branches† 
1987 980018 2172 674587 17857 106323 ...... 
1988 991750 795 655723 18185 113002 ...... 
1989 948013 -638 618654 18151 110784 .... 
1990 695050 -52884 558197 20399 99389 79 
1991 586347 -3589 549810 14539 104022 82 
1992 503428 -3305 488507 18600 97310 84 
1993 486491 75 475597 19063 98852 82 
1994 425415 -14293 479017 15989 24347 78 
1995 475299 -51533 618818 19836 51543 79 
1996 461859 -3266 583891 16326 28803 74 
1997 276303 12438 552490 10550 191658 68 
1998 376269 17368 582390 14855 198354 57 
1999 417759 15395 662055 17631 203315 60 
2000 457897 12775 784069 17696 201746 64 
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Year Total 
loans‡ 
Net 
result‡ 
Total 
deposits † 
Staff 
costs† 
Net Fixed 
Assets† 
Number of 
branches† 
2001 598717 14581 910008 20640 174559 65 
2002 725690 11070 1150713 14634 129332 88 
2003 790143 22164 1150739 25877 165261 91 
2004 812238 21112 1217481 28144 46235 96 
2005 871565 27807 1315379 29238 171924 99 
Source: Data collected by authors 
Note: ‡ are the outputs and † are the inputs  
Financial liberalization measures were effective in 1993, with the implementation of control 
mechanisms of the COBAC. So, we have a reasonable period before liberalization (1987-1993), and a 
reasonable period after liberalization (1994-2005). Variables available in all banks are divided into 
inputs and outputs, and are shown in Table 2 as well as their values. 
 
4  Methodology of estimates and results 
 
4.1  The DEA method of variable profit and the Malmquist Index 
The model with variable profit scale is appropriate to the environment of Cameroonian commercial 
banks, because it is based on the assumption that they operate at different sizes which are not 
necessarily optimal: due to imperfect competition, State regulations, and or various constraints. The 
principles of DEA are stated as follows: Suppose there are K inputs and M outputs for each of the 12 
banks (N) of the sample. Let xi and yi be inputs and outputs vectors of the ith bank. The input matrix 
X (K N) and the output matrix Y (Mr N) represent banks data. The objective is to measure the 
performance of each bank relatively to the best practice observed in the sample. Thus, the weights are 
attached to the inputs and to the outputs of each bank so as to solve the problem: 
Max u, v (yi / v xi),       (2) 
Under constraint (U / C) uyj / v xj ≤ 1, j = 1, ... , N, u, v ≥ 0 
where u and v are vectors (M.1) and (K 1) of the inputs weights and outputs weights, respectively. 
This involves finding the values of u and v, such that the measure of the efficiency of the ith bank is 
maximized, under the constraints that all efficiencies are less than or equal to one. A problem with this 
particular ratio formulation is that there are an infinite number of solutions. To avoid this, you can 
pose vxi = 1, which gives: 
Max u,v  (uyi)          (3) 
                                                                   S/C    vxi = 1 
                                                                   uyj .v xj ≤0              j =1,...........,N 
                                                                   u,v ≥ 0 
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This form is known as the "multiplicative form" of the linear programming problem. By using the dual 
program of linear programming, we derive an equivalent form of the problem of envelopment: 
Min θ,λ θ        (4) 
          S/C     -yi +Yλ ≥0 
θxi - Xλ≥ 0 
                                                                          λ≥  0 
where θ is a scalar and λ is a vector (N 1) of constants. The value of θ thus obtained will be the 
efficiency score of the ith business. We will have θ ≤ 1; with 1 indicating a point on the boundary and 
therefore an efficient business. It is worth noting that the linear programming problem must be solved 
N times: once for each bank in the sample. A value of θ is thus obtained for each bank. This is the 
linear programming of the DEA Model under the constant scale profit hypothesis. Programming is 
obtained in the case of variable scale profit by adding a further constraint, to take account of the 
convexity of the envelopment that is, N 1'λ= 1. 
When panel data are available; as is the case in this research, the Malmquist Index is needed to 
calculate productivity change and its decomposition into technical change and change in technological 
efficiency. This last component may in turn be decomposed into pure efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. The definition of the Malmquist Productivity Index oriented input assumes that at each 
period t = 1 ...T, the production technology st can be defined by the transformation of the input vector 
X'є Rn + into outputs vectors Y 'є Rn +. This means that st {xt, yt: can produce yt}. Between the two 
periods t and t +1, the Malmquist Index according to Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) is 
defined by: 
 
[ ] [ ]),(),(),(),( 1/11111),,,( 2/12/111 yxdyxdyxdyxdyxyx ttttttttttttM tttt ++++++=++
   (5) 
where dt represents the geometric distance. It represents the productivity at the production point (xt 
+1, yt +1) relative to the production point (xt, yt). A value greater than 1 indicates a positive growth in 
the total factor productivity between t and t +1. It can be broken down as follows, according Fare et al. 
(1994): 
[ ] [ ])),(/),((*)),(/),((),(/),( 1111*111),,,( 2/12/111 yxdyxdyxdyxdyxdyxdyxyx ttttttttttttttttttM tttt +++++++=++
 (6) 
The first factor in square brackets measures the change at level of technical efficiency (TEF) between t 
and t +1. There are two components which reflect the pure efficiency and the efficiency of scale, 
respectively. The index of pure efficiency is obtained by recalculating the efficiency indexes on the 
same data under the variable profit scale (VPS) hypothesis. The scale efficiency index (SEI) is the 
ratio of the efficiency under the constant profit scale hypothesis, over the variable profit scale 
hypothesis.      
The second term in brackets measures the change in technology that is, technology change between t 
and t+1. Algebraically, it is the geometric average of the measurements of the displacement of the 
boundary observed at the time t +1, then at the time t. 
  
4.2  Results and interpretations 
For a better understanding of the transmission channels of the effects of financial liberalization, it is 
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important to present successively its effects on the efficiency, and on the productivity of banks in our 
sample. The data collected in this study cover the period from 1987 to 2005. The DEA estimates are 
shown in Table 3. In this table, θ= the Farrell Efficiency. θ = 1 means that banks are efficient and are 
on the production boundary. 
Table 3 Bank efficiency in Cameroon before and after financial liberalization 
 Years Total loans (θ)  Slacks outputs Slacks inputs 
Loans Net 
results 
Deposits Staff costs Net fixed 
assets 
Number of 
branches 
 PERIOD PRIOR TO THE FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
1987 1                  0 0 0 0 0 0    
1988 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0,814 0 0 0 3384,812 0 0,719 
1991 0,735 0 0 417,144 0 12826,555 14,188 
1992 0,673 0 0 0 2869,911 6611,982 5,070 
1993 0,669 0 0 0 3518,583 9575,645 5,377 
Moyenne 0,842 - - 59,6 1396,2 4144,9 7,479 
 PERIOD AFTER THE FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
1994 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 0,957 0 0 0 1881,946 0 0 
1996 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0,944 0 0 0 1457,697 30154,692 0 
2000 0,849 0 0 0 0 75496,658 ,288 
2001 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Moyenne 0,979 - - 0 278,3 9361,54 0,107 
Source: Results obtained by DEA 
Banks having a value of θ less than 1 are ineffective, and are outside the production boundary. The 
degree of inefficiency is 1 - θ. The Slack Output corresponds to the excess output obtained without 
changing input. Slack Output = 0 means that the bank has reached its optimum production and 
therefore does not have a surplus of unnecessary resources.  
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The Slack Input is the amount of input which is not used during the production. Slack Input = 0 means 
that there is full utilization of production factors. Otherwise (that is slack input ≠zero), there is under-
use of certain inputs. For the year 1990, for instance, the efficiency of banks is 0.814, and the slacks 
inputs on staff costs and the number of agencies are different from zero, which means that banks 
during this period are ineffective and may therefore reduce the use of these inputs by 1- 0.814 that is 
18.6%, without reducing the amount of output.  
To study the actual effects of financial liberalization on the efficiency of these banks, we refer to the 
definition proposed by Farrell (1957); which states that a bank is effective if and only if its efficiency 
(θ) is equal to 1, and its slacks are all nil. 
The period between 1987 and 1993 precedes the implementation of the measures taken at the end of 
the financial liberalization of 1990. We expected an inefficiency of banks.  But this is not the case, and 
Table 3 shows that banks are fully effective between 1987 and 1989 (θ = 1, Slacks = 0). This 
efficiency is due to the refinancing system then in force. It allowed the Central Bank to refinance 
current loans without any requirement for banks which were rehabilitating their activities. The period 
between 1990 and 1993 corresponds to our expectations, because there is indeed a progressive 
inefficiency of banks. This is due to an under-utilization of inputs, and a slowdown in banking as a 
result of the anticipation of the devaluation that prompted many depositors to place their assets abroad, 
especially in France. 
With the implementation of measures of financial liberalization, we expected a gradual efficiency of 
banks. But we still find that they were ineffective in 1995, 1999, and 2000.  
To take a synthetic conclusion, we estimated a DEA before the application of measures of financial 
liberalization (between 1987 and 1993), and another from the application of those measures. We found 
that the efficiency of all banks in the first period is only slightly lower than that of the second period 
(0.842 against 0.979). From, the preceding facts, we can deduce that financial liberalization has 
stimulated, to some extent, the efficiency of commercial banks in Cameroon. The DEA method above 
does not permit the researcher to decompose efficiency following several sources. Table 4 calculates 
and decomposes the Malmquist Index according to productivity, over the study period. The 
availability of data imposes a certain inconsistency in the study periods; according to whether one is 
measuring the efficiency or the productivity. 
Productivity = Technology × Efficiency. For instance, in 1989 we note 0.640 = 0.943× 0.679.  If the 
year of reference is 1988, the measurement of the first variation is in 1989.  
A value greater than 1 indicates a positive productivity growth over the period; and a value less than 1 
indicates a decrease in productivity. On this basis, the period before liberalization is characterized by a 
decline in the total factor productivity by 20.9%: due both to the decrease in the technical efficiency 
(by 4%) and in the technical changes (by 16.8%). After the implementation of liberalization measures, 
there is a slight tendency to reverse the situation since the fall in overall productivity is less than 
proportional, compared to the period before (10 against 20%). Unlike in the period prior to the 
liberalization, its value results from two contradictory phenomena. 
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Table 4 Evolution of the total factor productivity (Malmquist’s Index) and its components before and 
after financial liberalization 
Source: Authors' estimates 
The overall technical efficiency has improved by 1.5% (1 to 1.015) and technological change 
deteriorated by 9.7%. The improvement on technical efficiency is mainly due to scale efficiency: pure 
technical efficiency remained constant for all observations. 
These two analytical approaches show that the results of financial liberalization are mixed; and the 
general finding is that the years of efficiency alternate with the years of inefficiency before and after 
liberalization. To understand these results, we will analyze the direction of variation of the 
transmission channels identified at the end of the literature review above. These channels are the debit 
and credit interest rates, the loan to the economy, and banking concentration. 
Year Global technical 
efficiency 
Technological 
change  
Pure technical 
efficiency 
Scale 
efficiency 
TFP  
PERIOD PRIOR TO FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
1989 0.943 0.679 1.000 0.943 0.640 
1990 1.000 0.679 1.000 1.000 0.679 
1991 1.000 0.782 1.000 1.000 0.782 
1992 0.988 0.828 1.000 0.988 0.818 
1993 0.870 1.193 1.000 0.87 0.038 
Moyenne 0.96 0.832 1.00 0.960 0.791 
PERIOD AFTER FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
1994 1.129 0.595 1.000 1.129 0.672 
1995 0.998 0.869 1.000 0.998 0.868 
1996 1.110 0.882 1.000 1.110 0.979 
1997 1.017 0.826 1.000 1.017 0.839 
1998 1.011 0.947 1.000 1.011 0.957 
1999 0.948 0.949 1.000 0.948 0.900 
2000 0.993 0.933 1.000 0.993 0.927 
2001 0.938 1.015 1.000 0.938 0.952 
2002 0.864 1.490 1.000 0.864 0.287 
2003 1.149 0.483 1.000 1.149 0.555 
2004 1.028 0.877 1.000 1.028 0.901 
2005 0.995 0.979 1.000 0.995 0.974 
Moyenne 1.015 0.903 1.000 1.015 0.900 
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Lending rates were virtually insensitive, while deposit rates moved in opposite directions; as opposed 
to expectations. Before liberalization, there were four institutional lending rates: 10.7% for the 
preferred short term, 17.4% for the regular short term, 9.3% for the preferred medium and long term, 
and 14.3% for the regular medium and long-term (World Bank, 1986). BEAC has set a very high 
Average Lending Rate (ALR) in favor of liberalization: about 20.1% between 1994 and 2004. But 
lending rates actually charged by banks are significantly below the ALR and are about 10.38% in 
2010. This leads COBAC (2010) to the conclusion that financial liberalization has not led to an 
increase in interest rates on the various aids granted by banks as it was expected. 
On the other hand, three deposit rates were in force during the period prior to liberalization: 10% for 
large deposits of 6 to 12 months, 8.25% for cash vouchers of 6 to 12 months, and 6.25% for saving 
deposits. The reforms led the BEAC to fix a single ALR to protect small savers. But it is 
systematically practiced by all banks and all deposits. Its value has never stopped decreasing since 
liberalization: from 5.5% between 1994 and 1999, to 5% between 2000 and 2005, to 3.5% today. 
However, liberalization has allowed banks to integrate the quality of loan applicants in their strategy 
of differentiation of lending rates; rather than sticking only to the duration.  
For example, the total effective rate (TER) of all credits to the economy; according to the time and 
according to the categories of beneficiaries, was 7.31% for large enterprises, 12.36% for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), and 14.91% for individuals (COBAC, 2010). This strategy is likely to 
increase the efficiency of banks, because it takes into account the risk of bad debts. 
As concerns deposits and loans (data in Table 2), bank deposits which were 590,913 between 1987 
and 1992 (before liberalization), were summed up to 806,357 between 1993 and 2005 (after 
liberalization): that is an upward variation of 37%. This trend was maintained. Instead of following 
this path, the importance of credit to the economy, as measured by the credit / GDP ratio increased 
slightly with liberalization (from 31.24% in 1982 to 36% in 1990) has not stopped declining to reach 
11.72% in 2005. This trend of excess liquidity as a result of liberalization is obvious. The liquidity 
ratio which was only 174.5% in 2000, reached 233.2 % in 2005; and since then, it has continued to 
move away from its normal value which is 100%. 
Following another approach let us consider William and Mahar (1998) who state that it is not only the 
amount of loans granted after financial liberalization that matters, but their greater efficiency. This can 
be seen through the changes in the distribution of funds according to their term and across sectors. As 
to their term, financial liberalization has not played for a long-term as it was planned. Before the 
implementation of this policy, short-term loans accounted for 70.1% of bank loans; against 29.9% for 
medium and long term loans (World Bank, 1986). In 2001, they accounted for 76.6% and 23.4% 
(BEAC 2001) and this trend is maintained. In overall, the Cameroonian banks are more likely to short-
term services such as overdrawn accounts, transfers, fees on foreign exchange transactions, and 
investments at the BEAC. 
Table 5 presents information on two years, depending on the sectoral distribution of loans: one year 
before liberalization and the other after liberalization (data are not available on all the years of the two 
sub-periods). 
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Table 5 Distribution of credit across sectors 
  1984 
(%) 
2010 
(%) 
1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4,18 7,54 
2 Mining, Oil 12,15 1,40 
3 manufacturing 20,66 23,91 
4 Water and electricity 2,75 2,14 
5 Construction and public works 7,09 9,73 
6 Commerce and Trade 32,31 21,49 
7 Services 11,34 24,82 
8 Miscellaneous (including loans) 9,42 8,97 
 
Total 100 100 
Source: constructed by authors from the World Bank (1986) and African Development Bank (ADB, 2012) 
One notes a transfer of loans from the sectors of Mining and Oil, Commerce and Trade to Services, 
Agriculture, and Manufacturing. This confirms a greater flexibility of banks in developing their 
strategy of loan in favor of liberalization. 
Banking concentration was not significantly attenuated as intended with liberalization, due to the 
reduction in the number of banks as a result of merging and direct acquisitions.  
For instance, in 1986, 40% of commercial banks controlled 80% of deposits and 85% of loans (World 
Bank, 1986). COBAC statistics (2003) show that three banks (BICEC, Credit Lyonnais and Societé 
Générale) that is, 25% of banks, appropriated 63% of funds raised in 2003. The same year, two banks 
(Societé Générale and BICEC) that is, 16% of banks, controlled the loan market to 44%. In terms of 
market share, concentration is measured by the place occupied by banks in the total assets. In 2003, 
three banks (Crédit Lyonnais, Société Générale and BICEC) represented a little more than 50% of the 
total assets amounting to 1.278 billion. We also assess banking concentration using the geographical 
distribution of bank branches within the country. Out of the 85 bank branches that the Cameroonian 
banking system had in 2003, a little more than 80% are grouped in the cities of Douala and Yaoundé. 
 
 
5  Conclusion and policy implications 
 
The objective of this research was to determine whether the financial liberalization measures 
implemented in Cameroon in 1993 had led to an increase in bank productivity in Cameroon. The 
results obtained by the DEA and the Malmquist Index are very mixed, and they do not argue in favor 
of a strengthening effect of financial liberalization on the efficiency of banks. This situation results 
from the combination of favorable and unfavorable facts.  
Two favorable facts are noteworthy: (i) liberalization allowed banks to integrate the quality of loan 
applicants in their strategy of differentiation of lending rates; rather than sticking only to the period; 
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(ii) there has been a transfer of loans from such sectors as Mining, Petroleum, Commerce, and Trade; 
to Services, Agriculture, and Manufacturing. This confirms a greater flexibility of banks in developing 
their loan strategy in favor of liberalization. As to unfavorable facts, lending rates and long-term loans 
were insensitive to liberalization; deposit rates, the amounts of loans to the economy, and banking 
concentration have evolved in the opposite direction as opposed to expectations. 
The diagnosis of these facts leads us to two conclusions. First, the fact that companies benefit from the 
most favorable lending rates to the detriment of small loan applicants is justified by the asymmetry of 
information that characterizes the bank / customer relationship. Secondly, a classification of the World 
Bank (2006) in the ascending order of bad business environments ranks Cameroon 130th out of 155. 
The indicators which were taken into account were date-lines in obtaining credits, the number and cost 
of procedures to start a business, the time and cost for negotiating a contract, the weight of taxes on 
business, and the scope of protection of property rights. 
Accordingly, we recommend that institutional measures be taken so as to improve the business 
environment and enable banks to overcome difficulties in having reliable accounting and financial 
information on loan applicants. Such measures will enhance the recovery of financial support to the 
economy and the transmission channels will become operational. 
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